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Abstract—For a Linear Time-Invariant (LTI) system, a net-
work of observers is considered where through asynchronous
(with bounded delay) communications, they all obtain the state
variables of the LTI system. In such setting, a new type
of adversarial nodes might affect the observation process by
impersonating the identity of the regular nodes, which is a
violation against communication authenticity. These adversaries
also inherit the capabilities of Byzantine nodes making them
more powerful threats called smart spoofers. We show how
asynchronous networks are vulnerable to smart spoofing attack.
In the estimation scheme considered in this paper, the estimated
state variables are flowed from the sets of source nodes, which
can detect a portion of the state variables each, to the other
follower nodes. The regular nodes, to avoid getting misguided by
the impersonation threats, distributively filter the extreme values
received from the nodes in their neighborhood. A topological
condition based on graph strong robustness is obtained to guar-
antee the convergence. Two simulation scenarios are provided to
verify the results.
Index Terms—Spoofing attack, strongly robust graphs, dis-
tributed observers, asynchronous network, communication delay
I. INTRODUCTION
SECURITY is becoming an increasingly important concernfor stability and safety of networked control systems.
Nowadays, in large-scale control systems, communication
channels connecting various physical components for real-
time measurement and control mostly make use of general
purpose cyber-networks such as the Internet and wireless
networks, which create vulnerabilities to adversarial intrusions.
While conventional network security-based measures may be
partially effective, novel resiliency methods explicitly taking
dynamical nature of physical components into account should
be developed as any failure in security of the cyber compo-
nents in such systems may turn into irrecoverable harms to
the physical infrastructure.
Security experts define various security goals including (i)
Confidentiality, ensuring privacy of important data against
outside eavesdroppers; (ii) Integrity, maintaining fidelity of
system signals; (iii) Availability, capability of timely having
access to the required signals; (iv) Authenticity, verifying the
identity of each signal; (v) Authorization, adjusting legitimacy
of access by each component to other parts of the system;
and (vi) Accountability, detection of any potential attacks and
faults in the system [1].
In this paper, we consider masquerading, spoofing, or imper-
sonation attack strategy on cyber-physical networked systems,
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which is a threat of authenticity. In literature, mostly, the
spoofing attack is concerned in the interactions between only
two agents: a spoofer and a normal. For example, [2] presents
an application of spatial processing methods for GPS spoofing
detection and mitigation. Also, a GPS spoofing scenario is
formulated as a constrained optimization problem and an
effective solution is provided to compute the falsified GPS
measurement of each time instant [3]. Moreover, vulnerability
of an unmanned vehicle to deceptive GPS signals, is consid-
ered in theory and practice [4]. The false-data injection attacks
to unmanned vehicles and confiscating its control system is
investigated in [5]. This differs a little from spoofing attacks.
The attacker masquerade as disturbance for the control system
of the vehicle and deviates its path smoothly. Furthermore, a
game-theoretic approach is developed in [6] to counteract the
spoofing attacks. The common point all the above researches
share is that there is no network of agents. Only two-side
interplay scenarios are considered, where the spoofing or mas-
querading is the attacking method. Recently though, [7] and
[8] focused on the sequels of spoofing attack on the network
of agents. However, the physical fingerprint of communication
signals and signal processing techniques are used to undo the
attacks. Here, we investigate the problem in the cases that
the attacker could break any type of encrypted signals which
makes it possible to perform masquerading. Particularly, our
emphasis is on the resiliency of a network in terms of its
topology which is a more basic level of counteraction to the
threat. Moreover, we combine adversarial capabilities of the
so-called Byzantine model, which is an integrity attack capable
of sending inconsistent erroneous signals to the receivers [9],
[10], with spoofing, that is use of other nodes’ identity to send
data on their behalf, and introduce a novel and more powerful
adversarial model called smart spoofer. In [11], resiliency of
synchronous networks is investigated against mobile Byzantine
adversaries that are different from our adversarial model. In
our setting, smart spoofers can use the asynchrony of network
communications to mislead the nodes with impersonated iden-
tities.
Spoof-resiliency techniques would be applicable and useful
in a broad range of wired and wireless networks including
sensor networks, in-vehicle networks, and Internet-based net-
works. For instance, the reader can refer to [12] for a GPS-
based network, [7] for multi-robot networks, and [13] for
CAN-based networks susceptible to be threatened by smart
spoofers. In particular, [7] studies Sybil attacks where the
attackers by jamming the server with fake identities cause an
availability threat, which is a special case of our adversarial
model.
One of the targets of spoofers in network systems would be
inserting erroneous values into the distributed state estimations
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2performed by the nodes. Distributed state estimation algo-
rithms are extensively studied in the literature [14]–[17]. How-
ever, most of the works focused on the interaction between
dynamic system properties, observers and the graph topology.
For example, a minimum cost communication graph which
enables limited communication for decentralized estimation is
investigated in [8]. The interplay between network connec-
tivity, global observability, and system instability is studied
in [14]. Necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of
distributed observers are studied in [15]. Also, [16] gener-
alizes the distributed observer design for LTI systems with
singular transition matrices. The resilience of such algorithms
against cyber attacks has recently received more attention. For
instance, the resiliency of LTI systems has been investigated
in [18] against Byzantine attacks.
In the current paper, we consider impersonation on a
network of distributed observers for an LTI system. Like
the settings of [19], [20], the observers communicate with
bounded delays and asynchrony and moreover must deal with
much stronger attacks, i.e. smart spoofing. Similar to [18],
[21], the regular (un-attacked) nodes are partitioned to source
nodes and follower nodes, where source nodes can detect the
corresponding eigenvalues and via distributively constructing
a directed acyclic graph (DAG), the associated state estimates
disseminate through the network. In both DAG construction
and estimation propagation, smart spoofers interfere to avoid
convergence. We utilize an approach based on local filtering
to defend against smart spoofing, turning into sufficient con-
ditions on network topology based on graph robustness which
is a connectivity measure (see [10], [22] for application of
similar filtering algorithms in consensus). Consistency of the
defined spoofing model with the network security literature,
consideration of delays, asynchrony, and accurate assumptions
in network communications make our proposed algorithms,
update rule, and concluding results more practical in real
world applications. Furthermore, despite [7], in our work the
attackers do not leave any sign and thus the regular nodes
cannot identify them. In the development of our results and the
proofs, we adopted the concept of motifs, the smallest possible
subgraphs of the original network with certain properties, as
a new proof technique. We analyze how the information is
disseminated through the motifs.
The paper is organized as follows. The preliminaries and
problem statement come in section II. In section III, we take
a look at the resilient distributed estimation scheme and the
local filtering-based algorithm that we used in this paper. Our
main results are presented in Section IV. We put forward the
simulation results in Section V. Finally, we conclude the paper
and discuss the future tendency of the research in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Notations
1) Graph Theory: A directed graph is represented by G =
(V, E), where the set of nodes and edges are represented by
V = {1, . . . , N} and E ⊆ V × V respectively. An edge from
node j pointing to node i implies data transmission from node
j to node i and is denoted by (j, i). The neighbourhood of the
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Fig. 1. A typical cyber-physical system: In the physical layer, the plant
dynamic (maybe unstable in some modes) propagates over time. In the cyber
layer, the plant’s outputs are monitored by a network of distributed observers
(R1, R2, . . . , RN¯ ) while only some of them are directly connected to the
plant. The network is threatened by adversarial units (s1, s2, . . . , sf ).
i-th node is defined by the set Ni = {j|(j, i) ∈ E}. A node j
is said to be an outgoing neighbour of node i if (i, j) ∈ E . A
spanning sub-graph for G is a sub-graph of G which contains
every vertex of G. Consider node v1 to vp of G. A path is
a sequence (v1, v2, . . . , vp) in which (vi, vi+1) ∈ E for i =
1, . . . , p− 1. The length of a path is measured by its number
of edges. A cycle is a sequence (v1, v2, . . . , vp, v1) in which
(vi, vi+1) ∈ E for i = 1, . . . , p−1 and (vp, v1) ∈ E . A directed
acyclic graph (DAG) is a directed graph which has no cycles.
For the consensus-based state estimation rule designed in
the paper, the critical topological notion is graph robustness,
which is a connectivity measure of graphs (see [23]).
Definition 1. (r-reachable set) For a graph G = (V, E) and a
set C ⊂ V , we say that C is an r-reachable set if there exists
an i ∈ C such that |Ni \ C| ≥ r, where r ∈ N+.
Definition 2. (Strongly r-robust w.r.t. S) For a graph G =
(V, E), a set of nodes S ⊂ V and r ∈ N+, we say that G
is strongly r-robust with respect to S, if for any non-empty
subset C ⊆ V \ S, C is r-reachable.
2) Linear Algebra: The set of all eigenvalues of a matrix
A is denoted by σ(A). The set of all marginally stable and
unstable eigenvalues of a matrix A is denoted by σU (A) =
{λ ∈ σ(A)||λ| ≥ 1}. We use aA(λ) and gA(λ) to denote
the algebraic and geometric multiplicities, respectively, of an
eigenvalue λ ∈ σ(A). An eigenvalue λ is said to be simple if
aA(λ) = gA(λ) = 1.
B. System Dynamics and Distributed Observers
Consider the following discrete-time LTI system
x[k + 1] = Ax[k], (1)
where k ∈ N is the discrete-time index, x[k] ∈ Rn is the state
vector and A ∈ Rn×n is the system matrix. The system is
observed by an N -node network G = (V, E). Access of the
i-th node to the measurement of time instant k is given by
3yi[k] = Cix[k], (2)
where yi[k] ∈ Rri and Ci ∈ Rri×n. For computational or
control purposes, each node needs to estimate the entire system
state x[k]. Nodes of the network G are called distributed
observers if they maintain and update the estimates using
only their own measurements and those received from their
neighbours. Fig. 1 shows the layout of a typical cyber-physical
system threatened by adversarial units. Let xˆi[k] denote the
state estimate of node i at each time step k. The following
definition describes the objective of the distributed estimation
scheme.
Definition 3. (Omniscience) Over the N -node network G,
the distributed observers are said to achieve omniscience if
limk→∞ |xˆi[k]− x[k]| = 0,∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}.
C. Adversarial Model
We consider an adversarial model that is able to threaten
the following system protection services: authentication, au-
thorization, confidentiality, integrity and availability. In what
follows, we formally define the abilities of such an adversarial
node.
Definition 4. (Smart Spoofer) An adversarial node is called a
smart spoofer if it has the following capabilities:
1) The adversarial node can have complete knowledge about
the topology, plant dynamics, and information flow over
the network at all time steps.
2) The adversarial node can refuse to perform any preas-
signed algorithm and can send arbitrary values to each of
its neighbours at the same time step.
3) The adversarial node can send its data with intended
delays and asynchrony.
4) The adversarial node can impersonate other nodes and
send arbitrary data with their identities.
The first two actions are performed by Byzantine adver-
saries, while the last one is performed by a threat called
spoofing or masquerading in [1] that directly threatens the
authentication among systems’ protection services. In fact, the
introduced adversarial model is an advanced spoofing threat
with additional capabilities of Byzantine adversaries that we
call smart spoofing. Note that we use the terms “spoof” and
“impersonate” interchangeably in the paper.
It is apparent that no distributed estimation algorithm would
succeed if all the nodes are adversarial. So, the set of nodes V
is partitioned into two subsets of regular nodes and adversarial
nodes denoted by R and A = V \ R, respectively. In the
literature dealing with distributed fault-tolerant algorithms, a
common assumption is to assign an upper bound f to the total
number of adversarial nodes in the network, which is known
as f -total adversarial model. To consider a large number
of adversaries in large scale networks, locally bounded fault
models are used, as in [24], defined below.
Definition 5. (f -local smart spoofer model) A set A of smart
spoofers is f -locally bounded if it contains at most f smart
spoofers in the neighbourhood of any of the regular nodes, i.e.
|Ni ∩ A| ≤ f, ∀i ∈ V \ A.
Similarly, any distributed estimation algorithm fails if a
smart spoofer can impersonate all the network nodes. Thus, to
tackle the problem, we impose an upper bound for the number
of nodes that smart spoofers can send data on their behalf as
follows.
Definition 6. (Capacity of smart spoofers) The maximum
number of nodes that a smart spoofer can send data on their
behalf at each time step, including itself, represents its capacity
and is denoted by α ≥ 1.
D. Problem Statement
In this paper, we aim to evaluate previous results on the
standard omniscience problem by considering much more
advanced adversarial model and more challenging constraints
on the network communications. Accordingly, we set the fol-
lowing assumptions on the network communications protocol
which bring up and remark the practical aspects of our results.
Assumption 1. All nodes update by a global clock. This
means that the sampling time T is the same for all observers.
Assumption 2. All nodes communicate through serial links
and have access to only the last data packet they have received
from neighbor nodes.
Assumption 3. All nodes make, at least, one update within k¯
steps and communication delays are upper-bounded by τ¯ .
Referring to the introduced LTI dynamical system and
the observation model of the network, we put forth a more
complicated version of the standard omniscience problem
(Definition 3) in the following definition.
Definition 7. (Resilient Omniscience) Given a system dynam-
ics of the form (1), a network represented by the graph G,
and an observer model at each node given by (2), a state
estimation design is said to achieve resilient omniscience if
limk→∞ |xˆi[k] − x[k]| = 0,∀i ∈ R, regardless of the actions
of any f -locally bounded set of smart spoofers.
The problem dealt with in this paper is the design of
a distributed estimation scheme proper to cope with smart
spoofers threatening a given cyber network observing an
LTI system. For this purpose, based on the assumptions on
the network communications protocol and the smart spoofer
adversarial model, we first present the distributed estimation
scheme under a specific network topology. Next, we analyse
the required constraints on the graph topology which guarantee
resilient omniscience by all regular nodes using the proposed
estimation law in the network.
III. RESILIENT DISTRIBUTED OBSERVERS
Under Byzantine adversarial model introduced in [9], the
network achieves omniscience by distributed observers pro-
posed in [18]. The design performs observation task by sep-
arating detectable and undetectable eigenvalues of the system
and the related states. Here, we use a similar scheme with
4a different distributed estimation rule proper for resilient
omniscience defined in Definition 7. To this end, consider
a Jordan canonical decomposition of state transition matrix
A with the following assumption on its eigenvalues. This
assumption is made for sake of simplicity and can be relaxed
with the techniques introduced in [18].
Assumption 4. All of the eigenvalues of A are real and
simple.
This assumption allows us to diagonalize A by the co-
ordinate transformation matrix Ψ = [ψ1, . . . , ψn], where
ψ1, . . . , ψn are n linearly independent eigenvectors of A. With
z[k] = Ψ−1x[k], the system (1) is transformed into the form
z[k + 1] = A¯z[k],
yi[k] = C¯iz[k], ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
(3)
where A¯ = Ψ−1AΨ is a diagonal matrix, and C¯i = CiΨ.
The eigenvalues of A¯ (which are the same as those of A)
are denoted by λ1, . . . , λn. Each regular node i distinguishes
its detectable and undetectable eigenvalues by PBH test and
divides them into the sets Di and Ui, respectively. Also, the
set of regular nodes are partitioned into sets of source nodes
and follower nodes as defined below.
Definition 8. (Source nodes and follower nodes) For each
λj ∈ σU (A), the set of nodes that can detect λj is denoted by
Sj , and is called the set of source nodes for λj . The rest of
the nodes are called follower nodes.
Each regular node, depending on being a source node or a
follower node for λj , adopts a different strategy for estimating
the related states.
A. State Estimation by Source Nodes
Each regular node i relies on its own measurements and
uses a Luenberger observer to estimate a portion of the states
associated to λj ∈ Di. In fact, regular node i is a source node
for each λj ∈ Di. To this end, let C¯ji stand for the column of
C¯i corresponding to the eigenvalue λj ∈ Di. Also, let zˆji [k]
denote the i-th node’s estimate of the state zj [k] corresponding
to the eigenvalue λj of the state vector z[k]. For each λj ∈ Di,
consider the following Luenberger observer at node i:
zˆji [k + 1] = λj zˆ
j
i [k] + L
j
i (yi[k]− C¯ji zˆji [k]), (4)
where Lji ∈ R1×ri is the observer gain matrix of node i for
λj ∈ Di. Since the pair (λj , C¯ji ) is detectable, Lji can be
chosen so that (λj−Lji C¯ji ) is Schur stable, so limk→∞ |zˆji [k]−
zj [k]| = 0.
B. Distributed State Estimation by Follower Nodes
A regular node i cannot estimate a portion of the states
associated with its undetectable eigenvalues of the system. In
fact, the regular node i is a follower node in estimating the sub-
state related to the eigenvalues λj ∈ Ui and needs to receive
information from its neighbours through a directed acyclic
graph for each λj (defined later) rooted in the set of associated
source nodes. In what follows, we propose an updating rule
for the follower node i accomplishing its estimation task in a
network with communication delays and partial asynchrony1.
Combining the ideas behind the consensus update rules
in [18] and [20], we present a novel update rule with the
following algorithm based on local filtering method for node
i to update its own state estimate for λj ∈ Ui.
1) Each regular node i, at each time step k when it wants
to update its estimate, gathers the state estimate of zj [k]
lastly received from only the nodes in N ji ⊆ Ni (N ji
represents the set of neighbors in the DAG related to λj
that is selected by Algorithm 1 for each regular node i,
which will be proposed later) and arranges them from the
largest to the smallest.
2) Node i drops the largest and smallest (β+ 1)f estimates
(β will be defined later) and executes the following update
rule:
zˆji [k + 1] = λj
∑
`∈N ji
ωji`[k]zˆ
j
` [k − k˜i`[k]− τi`[k]], (5)
where τi`[k] is the time delay of the last data packet
that node i has received from node ` until time instant k
(it may be time-varying), k˜i`[k] is the time steps elapsed
from the time that node i receives the packet of the node `
sent the last time before time k up to the time it makes an
update (k˜i`[k] < k¯), and ω
j
i`[k] is the weight that the i-th
node dedicates to the `-th node at the k-th time instant for
the estimation of zj [k]. The weights are non-negative and
chosen to comply
∑
`∈N ji ω
j
i`[k] = 1,∀λj ∈ Ui. Node
i removes the (β + 1)f largest and (β + 1)f smallest
estimates from N ji by setting their associated weights to
0. Note that delays have an upper bound (τi` < τ¯ ).
In practice, each node i has a memory for each of its
neighbors where stores the most recently received data. Node
i uses the most recent estimate values received from its
neigbours in N ji in update rule (5), regardless of delays and
asynchrony in communications.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we provide the main results of the paper
giving the analysis of the spoof-resilient distributed estimation
strategy and the topology constraints under which our adopted
algorithms and update rule succeed.
First, we consider how harsh the misbehaviour effects of
a smart spoofer would be in the network. In Definition 6,
we introduced the spoofing capacity in each time step. In the
following lemma, we generalize capacity of smart spoofers for
a period of time.
Lemma 1. Let Assumption 3 hold and capacity of a smart
spoofer be α. Then, each smart spoofer is able to send data
on behalf of β = αk¯−1 regular nodes within each consecutive
k¯ steps.
1The term partial asynchrony refers to the case where nodes share some
level of synchrony by having the same sampling times; however, they make
updates at different times based on bounded information delays [25]
5Proof. According to Definition 6, a smart spoofer can send
data on behalf of α nodes including itself at each time step.
Also, according to Assumption 3, all nodes have to make at
least one update within consecutive k¯ steps note that if a node
does not follow this rule can be detected as an adversarial node
by the regular nodes). Consider the time interval k+ 1 ≤ t ≤
k+ k¯. Let the smart spoofer choose to make an update with its
own identity at t = ks, where k+1 ≤ ks ≤ k+k¯. Considering
each consecutive k¯ steps, the smart spoofer s has α−1 capacity
for impersonation at ks and α capacity in other k¯ − 1 steps.
Therefore, the smart spoofer is able to impersonate αk¯ − 1
nodes overall within k¯ steps, i.e. α−1+α(k¯−1) = αk¯−1.
In fact, Lemma 1 indicates that we cannot simply replace
the smart spoofers and impersonated nodes with Byzantine
nodes. Because the key question is that how many Byzantine
nodes have the same effect of a smart spoofer with capacity
α. This is what we mathematically clarified in Lemma 1.
Asynchrony lets the adversarial nodes spoof a specific number
of regular nodes within each k¯ time-steps. Besides, from
adversarial nodes’ perspective, this spoofing (and sending false
data packets) must be continued for all the future time – in
every k¯ steps – in order to be effective. Thus, the distributed
algorithms of regular nodes must be modified to be resilient
against the attack. In other words, network providers need to
be aware that in a network with asynchrony (almost all the
networks are practically asynchronous), there is the possibility
of stronger attacks than Byzantine attack. The following
necessary condition on the network communications formally
states when a smart spoofer can impersonate regular nodes.
Proposition 1. Consider a network of nodes interconnected
by the graph G. Suppose that smart spoofers are able to
impersonate, at least, one regular node within each consecutive
k¯ steps (β > 0). For each regular node i ∈ R, a smart spoofer
s ∈ N ji can impersonate a regular node ` ∈ N ji ∩ R at a
time instant t > k only if the packet which is broadcast by
node ` at time instant t = k is received by node i with delay
k˜i`[k] + τi`[k] > 0.
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Considering Assumption 1,
let node ` ∈ N ji broadcast a data packet at t = k and node
i ∈ R receives the packet at the same time (τi`[k] = 0) and
use it for its next update at the same time (k˜i`[k] = 0). Also,
suppose that smart spoofer s decides to impersonate node `
for node i. There are two possibilities for the arrival time of
the packet sent by s to i. The packet can arrive either before
or after the time t = k (the time instant t = k is excluded as
it contradicts the Assumption 2). In case the packet sent by s
arrives at any time t > k, the node i has already accepted the
last packet it received, that is, the packet of node ` received
at t = k, and has already made an update. Otherwise, if the
packet sent by s arrives at any time t < k, then i will receive
the packet sent by node ` at t = k and since, according to
Assumption 2, all nodes only access the last data packet they
receive. In either case, the smart spoofer s fails to spoof node
i, which is a contradiction. This completes the proof.
Note that the necessary condition of Proposition 1 is inde-
pendent of amounts of communication delays. This is because
we would like to deal with smart spoofers that can impose
arbitrarily bounded amount of delays on their links to the
regular nodes, that is, if a smart spoofer wants to impersonate
node ` ∈ N ji , it can arrange to send the packet to node i after
node ` with appropriate delay so that it will be received after
the packet sent by node `. Then, node i accepts a packet sent
by s with identity of node ` as it is the last packet received.
According to Proposition 1, the best case for the regular
node i is that both k˜i`[k] = 0 and τi`[k] = 0, so the
smart spoofers in the neighborhood of i cannot impersonate
neighbors of the node i. However, even if we suppose that
k˜i`[k] = 0, i.e. node i has not any lag in updating its estimate
using the last data received from node `, regular nodes cannot
be sure about spoofing attack. In practice, the regular nodes
cannot guess, before receiving a packet, whether it will be
received with delay and, if so, how much the delay will
be (although communication links’ delays in real network
systems are inevitable). Besides, as we said, smart spoofers can
send data packets with intended delays. So, the regular nodes
must be aware that all the communications may be done with
delays in each time step. Therefore, to consider the worst case,
we develop our further results on required topology constraints
by assuming that the necessary condition on delays is satisfied
for all time in the network.
A. Spoof-Resilient Mode Estimation Directed Acyclic Graph
(SR-MEDAG)
Recall the local filtering for resilient consensus based esti-
mation law (5). Inspired by the algorithm presented in [18],
for construction of directed acyclic graphs associated with
undetectable eigenvalues of an LTI system, we present a spoof-
resilient algorithm which is distributively executed by all the
regular nodes. The overall distributed estimation scheme con-
stitutes the construction of these sub-graphs and the prescribed
local filtering-based algorithm which are performed in parallel.
In what follows, we define the directed acyclic graphs that are
paths for information flow over the network.
Definition 9. (SR-MEDAG) For each eigenvalue λj ∈ σU (A),
the spanning sub-graph Gj = (V, Ej) of G is Spoof-Resilient
Mode Estimation Directed Acyclic Graph (SR-MEDAG) if it
has the following properties:
1) If i ∈ (V \ Sj) ∩R, then |N ji | ≥ 2(β + 1)f + 1.
2) There is a partition of R into the sets Lj0,Lj1, . . . ,Ljξj ,
such that Lj0 = Sj ∩ R, and N ji ∩ R ⊆
⋃m−1
r=0 Ljr for
i ∈ Ljm, where 1 ≤ m ≤ ξj .
Also, N ji ∩R is the set of parent nodes of node i and Ljm is
the m-th layer of Gj . In fact, for each λj , we can organize the
set of regular nodes of the graph G as a directed acyclic graph
Gj . In Gj , the set of regular source nodes are denoted by Lj0.
Also, the set of regular nodes which have at least one path
with length of m to L0 are in the m-th layer of Gj denoted by
Lm. Each regular node in m-th layer has at least 2(β+1)f+1
parent nodes from the previous layers (
⋃m−1
r=0 Ljr).
Each regular node i ∈ R distributively executes the SR-
MEDAG construction algorithm, presented as Algorithm 1.
The final result of the algorithm for node i is the set N ji
6Algorithm 1: SR-MEDAG Construction Algorithm
while k ≤ K¯j
for λj ∈ σU (A)
Initialize ci(j) = 0,N ji = ∅.
if i ∈ Sj then
Node i updates ci(j) to 1, sets N ji = ∅, and
broadcasts a message χj (e.g. “110”) to its
neighbours.
end
if i ∈ V \ Sj then
if (ci(j) = 0, and node i has received mj
from at least 2(β + 1)f + 1 distinct
neighbours) then
Node i updates ci(j) to 1, stores the
labels of the neighbors from which it
received χj to N ji .
end
if ci(j) = 1 then
Node i broadcasts χj to its neighbours.
end
end
end
end
Result: N ji , ∀λj ∈ σU (A)
associated with every undetectable eigenvalue λj ∈ σ(A). By
executing the algorithm at each time step k, node i stores
a counter value ci(j) and a list of indices N ji in persistent
memories for each undetectable eigenvalue λj . The stored
values in N ji ⊆ Ni are the parent nodes’ indices of node
i in the SR-MEDAG of λj . Each regular node i starts with
ci(j) = 0 and N ji = ∅. If node i was a source node for λj , i.e.
i ∈ Sj , it sets ci(j) = 1 and N ji = ∅, then it begins and keeps
broadcasting an arbitrary preset message χj to its neighbors2
for at least K¯j steps (later we prove that K¯j is bounded). If
node i was a follower node for λj , i.e. i ∈ V\Sj , it waits until
it receives χj from at least 2(β + 1)f + 1 distinct neighbors.
Then, it sets ci(j) = 1, saves the indices of the neighbors from
which it received χj as N ji , begins and keeps broadcasting χj
to its neighbors for at least K¯j steps. Finally, we say that SR-
MEDAG construction algorithm terminates for node i if the
counter value ci(j) = 1, ∀λj ∈ σU (A). Also, we say that SR-
MEDAG construction phase terminates for λj if the counter
value ci(j) = 1, ∀i ∈ R.
Interestingly, it is not necessary for the regular nodes to
know K¯j (in that case, they have to execute the construction
algorithm for all the future time not up to K¯j). Indeed,
each regular node i can begin updating its state estimates
in parallel as soon as it sets ci(j) = 1 for λj although
the SR-MEDAG construction phase has not been terminated
yet. However, we know that the construction phase will be
terminated at some time instant in the future (bounded by
K¯j) when all regular nodes will be able to update their
2We used the term broadcast considering the case of wireless networks.
Regular nodes may transmit the information to their known outgoing neigh-
bors in wired networks.
own state estimates corresponding to each of the undetectable
eigenvalues using the distributed consensus-based rule (5).
In this regard, consider that delay and asynchrony do not
affect the output of the algorithm for each regular node i.
Because node i waits until it receives the predefined message
χj from a specified number of nodes regardless of the time it
takes. Indeed, asynchrony and bounded delays only postpone
termination of the algorithm.
Furthermore, one may concern that some of the regular
nodes are exposed to be impersonated by smart spoofers at
any time while they are executing the construction algorithm.
In fact, each smart spoofer not only can impersonate regular
nodes (by sending arbitrary messages other than the true
message χj on behalf of them) but also can misbehave as
follows:
i) It chooses to transmit any message different from the true
message χj from start to termination of the construction
phase.
ii) It transmits the true message before the counter value is
triggered by a regular node.
iii) It chooses not to transmit a message at all.
In the first case, regular nodes are able to identify the adver-
sarial node as it goes against the rules of Algorithm 1. In the
latter two cases, the adversarial node is undetectable by regular
nodes relying just on local information. However, later we
discuss constraints on the graph topology so that adversarial
nodes fail to make any problem neither for the construction
algorithm nor the estimation process.
It is noteworthy that the upper bound for the parameter
K¯j in Algorithm 1 is a function of the parameter β, which
is the capacity that asynchrony provides for smart spoofers
to impersonate regular nodes. This upper bound would be
different if we consider simply more Byzantine nodes instead
of spoofers and impersonated nodes. Actually, another con-
tribution of our paper with respect to [18] is the MEDAG
construction algorithm and its convergence time. In the case
of synchronous networks, each regular node updates only once
and goes to sleep, while, in asynchronous networks, regular
nodes have to continue updating up to K¯j time-steps in order
to complete the SR-MEDAG construction.
In the following theorem, we show that the sub-graphs
distributively found by the regular nodes, after termination of
the construction phase, satisfy properties of the SR-MEDAG.
Theorem 1. If the SR-MEDAG construction phase terminates
for λj ∈ σU (A), there exists a sub-graph Gj satisfying all the
properties of an SR-MEDAG.
Proof. First, we prove by contradiction that the spanning sub-
graph Gj is a directed acyclic graph. Suppose there is a
directed cycle iP i, where i and the nodes in P belongs to R.
The path P originates from i which changes its counter value
ci(j) from 0 to 1 and begins transmitting χj to its neighbors
at a time instant t = kji . Let the last node on the path P be
`. Clearly, node i receives data from node ` at a time instant
t > kji . As an edge from ` is pointing to node i, node i is
supposed to receive the message χj from node ` even when
its counter value ci(j) is set to 1. This contradicts what node i
7has to do according to Algorithm 1. The same argument holds
for every regular node belonging to Gj .
Next, we associate the notion of path length, referring to
graph theory, to the found sub-graphs after the termination of
the SR-MEDAG construction phase to show that the set R in
Gj is partitioned to the sets Lj0,Lj1, . . . ,Ljξj . To this end, let
a regular node i update its counter value ci(j) from 0 to 1 at
a time instant t = kji . Then, we say that the node i belongs to
Ljm of Gj if length of its longest path to a node in Sj be m
at kji . Apparently, Ljξj is set of the nodes which have at least
a path with maximum length (among all acyclic paths of Gj)
to a node in Sj as 1 ≤ m ≤ ξj . Accordingly, node i belongs
to Lj0 of Gj if i ∈ Sj ∩R. Now, suppose that the SR-MEDAG
construction phase terminates for λj ∈ σU (A). Since all the
nodes update their counter values from 0 to 1 at some time
instant, it is concluded that
⋃ξj
r=0 Ljr = R. Moreover, a regular
node in R cannot update its counter value at two different time
steps (the converse contradicts the rules of Algorithm 1). Thus
Ljr ∩ Ljs = ∅, ∀r 6= s. This completes the proof according to
the definition of the sets Ljm (0 ≤ m ≤ ξj).
Remark 1. Since the network communications are asyn-
chronous and because each regular node does not know the
communication delays between other nodes, regular nodes in
the sets Lj0,Lj1, . . . ,Ljξj do not update their counter values in
the same order as their layer number.
We intentionally used the minimum number of variables
to be communicated in SR-MEDAG so as to avoid potential
masquerading threats caused by those variables. For example,
it is not possible for regular nodes to realize their layer order
in Gj as they cannot identify which of their parent nodes are
spoofed. To clarify this, consider a regular node i in Ljm. The
regular node has to receive 2(β+1)f+1 incoming edges from
the nodes in
⋃m−1
r=0 Ljr which broadcast their layer numbers
so that the node i can realize its own layer number by sorting
the received values and selecting the maximum as the previous
layer number. However, smart spoofers can impersonate some
of these nodes and send a wrong layer number behind of them.
Thus, the node i can be deceived about the maximum layer
number it received. Interestingly, in our method, there is no
need that the regular nodes know their layer orders since they
only needs to know 2(β + 1)f + 1 of their parent nodes to
succeed in the estimation phase. Therefore, the construction
algorithm can still be executed distributedly. Moreover, our
strategy succeeds even if some of the source nodes in Sj are
smart spoofers.
B. Analysis of the Resilient Distributed Estimation Strategy
In this subsection, we introduce a repeating pattern sub-
graph which is used to simplify the analysis of our distributed
estimation scheme. These sub-graphs are constructed and
organized for each regular node according to its incoming
edges from smart spoofers and other regular neighbors. Note
that they may have overlaps in specific nodes and are defined
as follows.
Definition 10. (Motifs) Consider a regular node i ∈ Ljm at
time instant k and λj ∈ σU (A). Partition N ji into subsets {q},
Lj0
Lj1
Lj2
i
s
q
p1p2
h
Fig. 2. Motifs found in SR-MEDAG of Gj for f = 1 and β = 1 with
the regular node i in Lj2, three regular parent nodes of i in Lj0 (p1 and p2
are independent nodes of the motifs and q is a common node) and a parent
node in Lj1 which can be impersonated by a smart spoofer. Here, node h is
impersonated by the smart spoofer s for the node i.
{pr}, r = {1, 2, . . . , r}, and {hl}, l = {1, 2, . . . , l¯}, where q
and pr are the parent nodes of node i that are not impersonated
and hl is a smart spoofer in N ji or an impersonated parent
node of the node i. Then, Gji (l, r) =
(Vji (l, r), Eji (l, r)) is
a sub-graph of Gj indicating the motif associated with hl
and pr around the node i, where Vji (l, r) = {i, pr, q, hl} and
Eji (l, r) = {(pr, i), (q, i), (hl, i)}.
We aim to associate each motif Gji to each node i to ensure
that a smart spoofer or an impersonated node cannot deviate
the estimation of the node i. In fact, each motif is the smallest
sub-graph of Gj which is resilient against Byzantine attacks.
Note that impersonated regular nodes are potential Byzantine
adversaries since smart spoofers can use their identities to send
arbitrary values to their neighbours.
Definition 11. (Independent and common nodes) Consider γ¯
motifs associated with hl and pr around the regular node i
denoted by Gji (l, r), r = 1, 2, . . . , γ¯. Let pγ be a regular node
in the set Vij(l, r), r = γ. Then, pγ is an independent node if
pγ /∈ Vij(l, r) ∀r 6= γ. A node that is not independent is called
common.
The analysis strategy is to find the set of motifs around
node i ∈ Ljm such that they have only one common node.
The following lemma determines the number of such motifs
and investigates the possibility of this strategy (see Fig. 2 for
an example).
Lemma 2. Consider the network G which contains an SR-
MEDAG Gj for each λj ∈ σU (A). There exist at least (β+1)f
motifs around each regular node i ∈ Ljm, where each motif
has at least an independent node.
Proof. For each regular node i ∈ Ljm, referring to Defini-
tion 10, consider partitioning of N ji into subsets {q}, {pr},
r = {1, 2, . . . , r}, and {hl}, l = {1, 2, . . . , l¯}. Based on the
first property of SR-MEDAG Gj , we have N ji ≥ 2(β+1)f+1.
Under f -local smart spoofer model, there are at most f smart
8spoofers around the node i, i.e. |N ji ∩ R| ≥ (2β + 1)f + 1.
These regular nodes are parent nodes of i based on the second
property of SR-MEDAG Gj . According to Lemma 1, at most
βf of these parent nodes may be impersonated by the smart
spoofers. Thus, at most (β + 1)f of the nodes in N ji are
whether smart spoofers or impersonated parent nodes of the
node i which are partitioned as {hl}, l = {1, 2, . . . , l¯}, i.e.
l¯ ≤ (β + 1)f . We can organize at least (β + 1)f + 1 of
the remaining parent nodes, which cannot be impersonated, to
construct the motifs around the node i. Based on Definition 10
and Definition 11, we pick a parent node q as a common node
and leave the rest in the set of independent parent nodes {pr},
r = 1, 2, . . . , r, i.e. r ≥ (β + 1)f . Since r ≥ l¯, we can find at
least (β+1)f motifs around the regular node i such that all of
them have one common parent node q and each associated with
an independent parent node pr and a node hl. This completes
the proof.
Fig. 2 exhibits two overlapping motifs. In this example,
there is a smart spoofer node around the regular node i, i.e.
f = 1. Also, it is supposed that β = 1. Thus, according
to Lemma 2, two motifs are found around node i. Note that
smart spoofer s can impersonate node h, so a motif has to
be constructed with the node h as the adversarial node. Also,
node q is selected as the common node while p1 and p2 are
the two independent parent nodes of node i.
Next, we use the notion of motifs to analyze estimation
resilience of the network G enhanced by the distributed estima-
tion update rule (5) at each node against the adversarial nodes
in the presence of communication delays and asynchrony. We
start with regular node i ∈ Ljm and generalize our analysis to
the whole network afterwards.
Lemma 3. Consider the network G which contains an SR-
MEDAG Gj for each λj ∈ σU (A). Suppose that the state
estimates of regular parent nodes of node i ∈ Ljm, for the
state related to λj , converge to zj asymptotically. Then, the
local filtering-based algorithm governed by update rule (5)
ensures that limk→∞ |zˆji [k] − zj [k]| = 0 in the presence of
communication delays and asynchrony under f -local smart
spoofer model.
Proof. Based on Lemma 2, node i has at most (β + 1)f
potential threats and at least (β + 1)f motifs around node
i such that they have one common node. Consider the motifs
around node i: Gji (l, r), r = 1, 2, . . . , r, l = 1, 2, . . . , l¯, where
r ≥ (β + 1)f and l¯ ≤ (β + 1)f . Let pr be an independent
parent node of the node i, q the common parent node, and hl
the potential Byzantine adversarial node in Gji (l, r), where the
state estimation of pr and q converge to zj asymptotically for
the state related to λj . For simplicity of notations, we define
ki` = k − k˜i`[k]− τi`[k].
For each node i, at time instant k, we calculate the esti-
mation error of node ` ∈ N ji for zj [k] by the last transmitted
data to the node i: ej` [k] = zˆ
j
` [ki`]−zj [k]. Also, the estimation
error of the node i for zj [k] at time instant k is denoted by
eji [k] = z
j
i [k] − zj [k]. Then, subtracting zj [k + 1] from both
sides of (5) and noting that zj [k+ 1] = λjzj [k] based on (3),
we derive the following equation from (5):
eji [k + 1] = λj
∑
`∈N ji
ωji`[k]zˆ
j
` [ki`]− λj
( ∑
`∈N ji
ωji`[k]
)
zj [k]
=
l¯∑
l=r=1
(
λjω
j
ipr
[k]zˆjpr [kipr ]− λjωjipr [k]zj [k]
+ λjω
j
ihl
[k]zˆjhl [kihl ]− λjω
j
ihl
[k]zj [k]
)
+
r∑
r=l¯+1
(
λjω
j
ipr
[k]zˆjpr [kipr ]− λjωjipr [k]zj [k]
)
+ λjω
j
iq[k]zˆ
j
q [kiq]− λjωjiq[k]zj [k]
= λj
l¯∑
l=r=1
(
ωjipr [k]e
j
pr [k] + ω
j
ihl
[k]ejhl [k]
)
+ λj
r∑
r=l¯+1
ωjipr [k]e
j
pr [k] + λjω
j
iq[k]e
j
q[k],
(6)
where we know that
∑
`∈N ji ω
j
i`[k] = 1. Equation (6) rep-
resents that the estimation error of the node i is a linear
combination of the estimation errors of its neighbours which
are grouped as motifs. For the un-impersonated parent nodes
of node i, we have limk→∞ ejq[k] = 0 and limk→∞ e
j
pr [k] = 0,
r = 1, 2, . . . , r.
Now, consider the motifs Gji (l, r), l = r = 1, 2, . . . , l¯ (note
that r ≥ l¯) for the adversarial nodes h`, l = 1, 2, . . . , l¯. In
construction of the motifs, we arbitrarily pick the common
node q; so we suppose that zˆjpr [k] ≤ zˆjq [k], r = 1, 2, . . . , l¯.
The following two cases are possible regarding the estimation
values of the nodes in the motif Gji (l, r): (i) zˆjhl [k] < zˆjpr [kipr ]
or zˆjhl [k] > zˆ
j
q [k], (ii) zˆ
j
pr [k] ≤ zˆjhl [k] ≤ zˆjq [k]. In the
former case, according to the local filtering algorithm, values
of the node hl will be removed by setting ωihl [k] = 0. From
the latter case, we infer that ejpr [k] ≤ ejhl [k] ≤ ejq[k]; the
estimation error of the adversarial node hl will be trapped by
the estimation errors of the parent nodes pr and q in motif
Gji (l, r) at time step k and will be sandwiched by them over
time as they converge to 0 asymptotically. Thus, noting that
τi`[k] and k˜i` are upper bounded by τ¯ and k¯, we conclude that
limk→∞ e
j
hl
[k] = 0.
The same argument holds for all adversarial nodes hl ∈
Gji (l, r), l = 1, 2, . . . , l¯. Therefore, the estimation error
eji [k + 1], which is the linear combination of the estimation
errors ejpr [k], r = 1, 2, . . . , r, e
j
hl
[k], l = 1, 2, . . . , l¯ and ejq[k],
converges to 0, i.e. limk→∞ e
j
i [k] = limk→∞ |zˆji [k]−zj [k]| =
0,∀i ∈ Ljm.
Now, we analyze resilience of the estimation of all the
follower nodes in the whole network G with communication
delays and asynchrony against f -local smart spoofer model.
Lemma 4. Consider the network G which contains an SR-
MEDAG Gj for each λj ∈ σU (A). Then, for each reg-
ular node i ∈ R and each λj ∈ Ui, the local filtering-
based algorithm governed by update rule (5) ensures that
9limk→∞ |zˆji [k]−zj [k]| = 0 in the presence of communication
delays and asynchrony under f -local smart spoofer model.
Proof. As G contains an SR-MEDAG for each λj ∈ σU (A),
the sets Lj0,Lj1, . . . ,Ljξj form a partition of the set R. To
prove, we use induction on the layer number m.
For m = 0, by definition of the set Lj0, all the regular
nodes in Lj0 belong to the set Sj and can estimate zj [k]
asymptotically. Then, consider the regular node i belonging
to the set Lj1. Suppose that the regular node i has f incoming
edges from adversarial nodes. Then, according to Lemma 2,
we can find at least (β + 1)f motifs around node i with each
of them having an independent regular source node from the
set Lj0. Each smart spoofer is able to impersonate at most βf
parent nodes of i. So, there are at most (β + 1)f Byzantine
adversarial nodes (including smart spoofers and impersonated
regular nodes) around node i. However, we infer from Lemma
3 that the state estimate value of each adversarial node is
trapped and sandwiched by one of the motifs according to
the local filtering algorithm. Thus, the state estimate of node
i converges to zj asymptotically.
Next, suppose the result holds for the regular nodes of all
layers from 0 to m (where 1 ≤ m ≤ ξj − 1). By induction, it
is concluded that the result holds for all the regular nodes in
Ljm+1 as well based on the definition of SR-MEDAG.
Due to the linear dynamics of the local Luenberger ob-
servers for source nodes and since the estimation error of each
follower node is a linear combination of its un-impersonated
parents, we infer the following corollary about the convergence
rate of the follower nodes’ estimation error.
Corollary 1. Estimation convergence rate of all the follower
nodes in the network is exponential as the estimation error of
the source nodes converges to 0 exponentially.
Theorem 2. Consider the network G which contains an SR-
MEDAG for each λj ∈ σU (A). Then, the distributed estima-
tion scheme governed by the Luenberger observers described
by (4), and the local filtering-based algorithm governed by
update rule (5), achieves resilient omniscience in the presence
of communication delays and asynchrony under f -local smart
spoofer model.
Proof. Based on the observable canonical decomposition rep-
resented by (3), for each regular node i, states of the dy-
namics system (1) are mapped and partitioned into two sub-
states zDi [k] and zUi [k] corresponding to the detectable and
undetectable eigenvalues of the node i, respectively. Using the
designed Luenberger observers, zˆDi [k] converges to zDi [k]
asymptotically. As an SR-MEDAG exists for each λj ∈
σU (A), the result of Lemma 4 also holds. Consequently, node
i is able to estimate zUi [k] asymptotically even in the presence
of communication delays, asynchrony and adversarial actions
of smart spoofers. Combining these results, we infer that node
i can estimate the entire state z[k] which leads to resiliently
observing x[k] using the transformation x[k] = Ψz[k]. This
completes the proof.
C. Spoof-Resilient Graph Topologies
In this subsection, we characterize graph topologies which
ensures termination of the SR-MEDAG construction phase for
each λj ∈ σU (A) under misbehavior of smart spoofers.
Lemma 5. The SR-MEDAG construction phase terminates for
λj ∈ σU (A) if G is strongly
(
3(β+1)f +1
)
-robust w.r.t. Sj .
Proof. Contradiction is used for the proof. Consider any λj ∈
σU (A) and let G be strongly
(
3(β+ 1)f + 1
)
-robust w.r.t. the
set of source nodes Sj . If the SR-MEDAG construction phase
does not terminate for λj , there exists a set of regular nodes
C ⊆ V \ Sj which never update their counter values ci(j)
from 0 to 1 for i ∈ C. As G is strongly (3(β+1)f+1)-robust
w.r.t. Sj , it follows that C is
(
3(β + 1)f + 1
)
-reachable, i.e.,
there exists a node i ∈ C which has at least 3(β + 1)f + 1
neighbours outside C. Under the f -local smart spoofer model,
at most f of these nodes are smart spoofers which are able
either to misbehave themselves or to impersonate βf regular
nodes during the SR-MEDAG construction phase. So, at least,
2(β+1)f +1 of them are regular nodes with ci(j) = 1 which
must have transmitted χj to node i. Thus, node i must have
changed ci(j) from 0 to 1 at some point of time, according to
the rules of Algorithm 1. This is a contradiction.
Proposition 2. Suppose that G is strongly (3(β + 1)f + 1)-
robust w.r.t. Sj , ∀λj ∈ σU (A), and let the SR-MEDAG
construction phase starts at k = 0. Then, K¯j in Algorithm 1 is
upper bounded by l¯j
(
(η+1)k¯+τ¯+1
)
where η = βb(τ¯−k¯)/k¯c
and l¯ is length of the longest path of Gj .
Proof. Since G is strongly (3(β + 1)f + 1)-robust w.r.t.
Sj , according to Lemma 5, each regular node has at least
2(β + 1)f + 1 parent nodes which remain safe from spoofing
and transmit χj at least once to the regular node. Each of
these parent nodes has to make at least an update within k¯
consecutive steps.
We consider two separate cases: i) τ¯ ≤ k¯ and ii) τ¯ > k¯. Let
node i be in Lj1 of Gj . In the first case, each smart spoofer
s ∈ N ji is able to impersonate at most βf parent nodes of
node i in each consecutive k¯ steps. So, the other 2(β+ 1)f +
1 parent nodes will remain safe and transmit χj to node i.
For the second case, we consider the worst case where all
these parent nodes postpone their updates by k¯ − 1 steps and
communicate to their neighbors with τ¯ steps delay (because
we are seeking the maximum time steps that a smart spoofer
can prevent exactly 2(β + 1)f + 1 parent nodes to transmit
χj to their neighbors). As τ¯ > k¯, the smart spoofer has more
η = βb(τ¯−k¯)/k¯c capacity after the first update to impersonate
more parent nodes. However, they cannot do it permanently,
i.e. at some time the parent nodes will transmit χj to node i.
Suppose that the smart spoofer use this additional capacity to
impersonate just one additional parent node. In fact, η updates
of this parent node will be spoofed which takes ηk¯ time steps.
Considering the first k¯ − 1 steps that the parent node may
postpone its first update and τ¯ steps delay of its last update, the
overall time that the spoofed parent node succeeds to transmit
χj to node i will be (η + 1)k¯ + τ¯ + 1 steps.
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Now, consider the last node in the longest path of Gj which
is the last node that updates its counter value from 0 to 1. Let
the length of the longest path of Gj be l¯j and each node in
this path updates its counter value from 0 to 1 after at most
(η + 1)k¯ + τ¯ + 1. Then the maximum time needed for each
regular node to keep transmitting χj is bounded by l¯j
(
(η +
1)k¯ + τ¯ + 1
)
.
Remark 2. The maximum time that is needed for each
regular node i ∈ Ljm to keep transmitting χj is bounded by
(l¯j −m)
(
(η + 1)k¯ + τ¯ + 1
)
. However, as the regular nodes
cannot characterize their layer numbers, they have to keep
transmitting the message χj up to K¯j steps.
Finally, we propose the overall constraint on the network
topology which makes sure that the network achieves resilient
omniscience despite of smart spoofing actions.
Theorem 3. Resilient omniscience of a network with commu-
nication delays and asynchrony under f -local smart spoofer
model is achieved using the proposed estimation scheme if G
is strongly
(
3(β + 1)f + 1
)
-robust w.r.t. Sj , ∀λj ∈ σU (A).
Proof. According to Lemma 5, the SR-MEDAG construction
phase terminates for every undetectable eigenvalue λj if G
is strongly
(
3(β + 1)f + 1
)
-robust w.r.t. Sj , ∀λj ∈ σU (A).
Thus, based on Theorem 1, as SR-MEDAG exists for every
λj ∈ σU (A). Finally, from Theorem 2, the existence of an SR-
MEDAG for every λj ∈ σU (A) leads to resilient omniscience
by using our proposed distributed estimation scheme in a
network with communication delays and asynchrony under f -
local smart spoofer model.
Remark 3. Suppose that smart spoofers impersonate none
of the regular nodes during SR-MEDAG construction phase.
Then, the sufficient constraint on the network topology to
achieve resilient omniscience is strongly
(
2(β + 1)f + 1
)
-
robust w.r.t. Sj , ∀λj ∈ σU (A).
Note that the presented sufficient conditions on the topology
will be the same as the case of Byzantine attacks, proposed
in [18], if we set the parameter β = 0. It means that the
estimation will converge for all regular nodes under a simpler
topology, i.e. strongly (3f+1)-robust w.r.t. Sj , ∀λj ∈ σU (A).
This is consistent with the most important massage of our
paper which asserts that asynchronous networks are more
susceptible against cyber attacks; asynchronous networks can
be threaten by adversaries that are stronger than Byzantine
nodes, i.e. smart spoofers, which can use free time-steps
between updates of regular nodes to impersonate some of them
in order to mislead the others.
D. Further Results and Discussions
1) Time-Varying Networks: The observers network G in the
presented results have been supposed to be fixed, that is, the
edge set E has been time invariant. We now reconsider the
results with a partially asynchronous time-varying network
G[k] = (V, E [k]) instead of the original time-invariant graph
G earlier. To this end, similar to what is presented in [19], we
define a jointly graph robustness measure as follows.
Definition 12. (Jointly strongly r-robust w.r.t. S) The time-
varying graph G[k] = (V, E [k]) is said to be jointly strongly
r-robust w.r.t. S if there exists a fixed µ¯ ≥ 0 such that⋃µ¯
µ=0 G[k − µ], k ∈ Z≥µ¯, is strongly r-robust w.r.t. S.
Referring to Lemma 1, the capacity of smart spoofers for
impersonating regular nodes is bounded within each consec-
utive k¯ steps by β. Thus, the horizon parameter µ¯ of time-
varying graph G[k] has to satisfy the following inequality:
µ¯ ≤ k¯. (7)
Note that, otherwise, each smart spoofer would have extra
capacity to impersonate more than β regular nodes after each
k¯ steps.
Now, the following result states the extension of our main
result (Theorem 3) for the case of time-varying networks.
Corollary 2. Resilient omniscience of a network with com-
munication delays and asynchrony under f -local smart spoofer
model can be achieved using the proposed estimation scheme
if G is jointly strongly (3(β+1)f+1)-robust w.r.t. Sj , ∀λj ∈
σU (A), under the condition (7).
Similarly, reconsidering the case where smart spoofers do
not impersonate any of the regular nodes during the SR-
MEDAG construction phase, the following result holds for
time-varying networks.
Corollary 3. Suppose that smart spoofers impersonate none
of the regular nodes during SR-MEDAG construction phase.
Then, the sufficient topology constraint on the network G[k] to
achieve resilient omniscience is jointly strongly
(
2(β+ 1)f +
1
)
-robust w.r.t. Sj , ∀λj ∈ σU (A), with the condition (7).
These results follow from Lemmas 3 to 5 since in the
proofs there, the time-invariant nature of the original graph G
is not used.
2) Randomized Update Rule: Consider the case that each
regular node, at each time instant, randomly decides whether
to update its state estimate or not. That is, the follower node
i ∈ R updates its state estimate at each time instant k
with the probability of Pi[k]. Note that with such updates,
the algorithm remains fully distributed. Even the probabilities
Pi[k] need not be identical. Intuitively, this is in alignment
with Assumption 3 as the regular node will update at least
once within each consecutive k¯ steps. With this strategy, the
topology constraint required for resilient omniscience can be
relaxed. This is because the smart spoofers cannot predict
the update times in advance and need to use more of their
spoofing capacity to make sure that the regular nodes, at each
time step, receive and accept false data with fake identities;
they cannot impersonate other nodes in a systematic manner
in each consecutive k¯ steps. In fact, regular nodes utilized
randomization in update times as a defensive means against
smart spoofers.
What follows is the modification of Theorem 3 for the
suggested network with randomized updating strategy.
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Fig. 3. A sample network that is
(
2(β + 1)f + 1
)
-robust w.r.t. λj . Node
h ∈ R1 is impersonated by the smart spoofer s for the nodes in set R3.
Theorem 4. Resilient omniscience of a network with com-
munication delays and asynchrony under the f -local smart
spoofer model can be achieved using the proposed estimation
scheme if each follower node i ∈ R, at each time instant k,
updates using rule (5) with the probability of Pi ∈ (0, 1] and if
G is strongly (3(β′+1)f +1)-robust w.r.t. Sj , ∀λj ∈ σU (A),
where β′ = bβ/k¯c+ 1.
Proof. Referring to Lemma 1, each smart spoofer was able
to impersonate at most β regular nodes within k¯ steps in
case the smart spoofers knew when exactly each regular node
updates its state estimate. Now, consider that each regular node
i make an update at each time instant k randomly with a
probability of Pi[k] ∈ (0, 1]. Then, each smart spoofer s ∈ Ni
cannot predict when exactly the node i updates; so it has to
impersonate the incoming neighbors of the node i for all the
time steps within each consecutive k¯ steps, that is k¯ times. As
a result, the smart spoofers need to dedicate more capacity to
produce faulty data packets with the mimicked identities of
the neighbors of the node i. Thus, the smart spoofers will
be able to impersonate bβ/k¯c regular nodes for any of k¯
steps and one regular node for a limited number of time-
steps, i.e. less than k¯. In this situation, to ensure that the
smart spoofers cannot impersonate any extra regular nodes, we
define β′ = bβ/k¯c + 1. Accordingly, similar to the proof of
Theorem 3, the required topology constraint for omniscience
based on the parameter β′ is strongly
(
3(β′+ 1)f + 1
)
-robust
w.r.t. Sj , ∀λj ∈ σU (A).
Remark 4. Based on Lemma 1, we have β′ = b(αk¯− 1)/k¯c.
On the other hand, we know k¯ ≥ 1. Therefore, it is concluded
that β′ = α− 1 in the case of a synchronous network (k¯ = 1)
and β′ = α in an asynchronous network (k¯ > 1).
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present a simulation example to demon-
strate how a smart spoofer can misbehave and how it can
be restrained in a given network of distributed observers.
In particular, we show why the constraints on the network
topology, proposed in Theorems 2 and 3, are critical for
achieving resilient omniscience under f -local smart spoofer
model in the presence of asynchronous communications and
delays.
To this end, consider the network illustrated in Fig. 3. The
directed edges of the graph represent all to one connections
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Fig. 4. Omniscience of the sample network: the regular source nodes in R1
asymptotically estimate z1 using Luenberger observers. The follower nodes
in R2 and R3 can asymptotically estimate z1 despite of the efforts smart
spoofer does for misleading them by impersonating the node h ∈ R1. They
also estimate z2 since there is no spoofing for λ2.
and edges pointing in both directions represent all to all
connections. The network has three sets of regular nodes
R1, R2, R3, and a smart spoofer s (f = 1). The capacity
of s is assumed to be α = 1 and all of the nodes are
supposed to make, at least, an update within k¯ = 2 steps.
Thus, the parameter is set as β = 1. There are 2(β + 1)f
nodes in each of the sets R1 and R2 and 2(β + 1)f + 1
nodes in the set R3, where the nodes within each set are
not connected. Furthermore, communication delays over the
network are defined as follows:
τij =

3, if (i ∈ R3 and j ∈ R2)
2, if (i ∈ R2 and j ∈ R3) or (i ∈ R3 and j ∈ R1)
1, if (i ∈ R1 and j ∈ R3) or (i ∈ R3 and j = s)
0, if i = s and (j ∈ R1 or j ∈ R2)
Note that the smart spoofer fully knows the dynamic system
and the observation models of the regular nodes and calculates
its own and the impersonated states estimations in a way that
the targeting regular nodes fail to reach omniscience. Thus, to
give a better intuition, we deal with the transformed dynamic
system and states in our simulations; the original system can
be analyzed accordingly. For sake of simplicity, we use the
terms “send” and “receive” with zˆi1 (or zˆ
i
2), while our purpose
is the original state xˆi1 associated to the zˆ
i
1.
The transition matrix of the original dynamic system and
the initial state are assumed to be
A =
[
0.98 0.02
−0.04 1.04
]
, x0 =
[
2
5
]
,
which, according to (3), are transformed by
Ψ =
[
0.1 1
0.2 1
]
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Fig. 5. All the regular nodes truly estimate x1 while the smart spoofer s
impersonates the node h ∈ R1 for the nodes in R3.
into the following diagonal system and initial state:
A¯ =
[
1.02 0
0 1
]
, z0 =
[
30
−1
]
.
The first eigenvalue of the system (λ1 = 1.02) is unstable and
the second one (λ2 = 1) is marginally stable. The observation
model of the network system is assumed to be Ci = [−10 10],
∀i ∈ R1, Ci = [2 − 1], ∀i ∈ R2 and Ci = 0, ∀i ∈ R3.
The transformation of the observation model is given by Ψ
as C¯i = [1 0], ∀i ∈ R1, C¯i = [0 1], ∀i ∈ R2 and C¯i = 0,
∀i ∈ R3. This means that the nodes in R1 are source nodes
for λ1 and followers for λ2 as they can only detect λ1, the
nodes in R2 are source nodes for λ2 and followers for λ1,
and the nodes in R3 are followers for both λ1 and λ2. Also,
the nodes in the set R3 and the node s update at all time
instants and the nodes in R1 and R2 update at time instants
k = mk¯, m ∈ Z+.
We present the simulation results in two test scenarios. In
both scenarios, the smart spoofer just impersonate only one
node in R1 and only for the state z1. Thus, all the nodes of
the network will accurately estimate the state z2. In scenario
1, we show that the follower nodes for λ1 can asymptotically
estimate z1 even though the smart spoofer s tries to mislead the
follower nodes but the network finally achieves omniscience.
However, in scenario 2, the follower nodes cannot reach a
true estimate of z1 as the required topology constraint for
estimation (Theorem 2) is not satisfied.
Scenario 1. The smart spoofer sends the message χs = 1
to all the nodes in R3 to pretend that it is a parent node
for λ1. Although the smart spoofer can impersonate a regular
node during the SR-MEDAG construction phase, it decides
not to do so and goes through the estimation phase. The initial
estimates of z1 for nodes in R1 are zˆi1[0] = 100, i = 1, 2 and
zˆi1[0] = 0, i = 3, 4. Also, we have zˆ
i
1[0] = 0, i ∈ R2, and
zˆi1[0] = 0, i ∈ R3. Moreover, each regular node i ∈ R1 uses
a Luenberger observer with the gain L1i = 0.5 to estimate z1.
Starting the estimation phase, the smart spoofer s sends two
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Fig. 6. The smart spoofer s prevents the follower nodes for λ1 in R2 and
R3 to estimate z1 by sending false estimate values on behalf of node h ∈ R1
to all the nodes in R3.
sequences of estimate values to all the nodes in R3 in a way
that the receiving estimate values from the nodes in R1 are
eliminated in local filtering: i) the estimate value zˆs1[k] = 60,
where k = mk¯−1,m ∈ Z+, which keeps the smart spoofer s
among the accepted neighbors of the nodes inR3 as each node
has to send a data packet at least in each consecutive k¯ steps, ii)
a false estimate value zˆh1 [k] = 30, where k = mk¯,m ∈ Z≥0,
on behalf of the node h = 1, h ∈ R1 to the nodes in R3. As
shown in Fig. 4, all the regular nodes can estimate z1 although
the smart spoofer caused a deviation in the estimations of the
nodes in R3 (and accordingly the nodes in R2) up to time
instant k = 12. Note that the estimate value of zˆh1 [k] will
not be filtered only if it converges to z1. In fact, referring to
Lemma 3, estimate values of the smart spoofer are sandwiched
by estimate values of the regular parent nodes, thanks to
our proposed rule (5) and the network topology constraint
discussed in Theorem 2.
Scenario 2. Here, the smart spoofer s sends a message χs =
1 to the nodes in R3 while it impersonates the node p =
1, p ∈ R1 in the SR-MEDAG construction phase by setting
the message χp = 0, i.e. the node p cannot be a parent node
of the nodes in R3 for λ1. In other words, Algorithm 1 does
not terminate in the case of λ1 for the nodes in R3. In fact,
the constraint on the network topology is not satisfied for the
estimation of z1 since the nodes in R3 recognizes only 2(β+
1)f parent nodes for λ1. However, assume that the nodes in
R3 decide to start the estimation regardless of the termination
of the SR-MEDAG construction phase. As a result, the smart
spoofer is able to impersonate one more regular node of the
set R1 this time in the estimation phase. The initial estimates
of z1 are given as zˆi1[0] = 10, i ∈ R1, i = 2, zˆi1[0] = 0,
i ∈ R1, i = 3, 4, zˆi1[0] = 6, i ∈ R2, and zˆi1[0] = 7, i ∈ R3.
Again, the smart spoofer s sends two sequences of estimate
values to the nodes in R3 in a way that the estimate values of
the nodes i ∈ R1, i = 3, 4, are eliminated in local filtering:
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Fig. 7. The regular nodes in R2 and R3 fail to estimate x1 if the smart
spoofer s impersonates the node h ∈ R1 for the nodes in R3.
i) the estimate value zˆs1[k] = 8, where k = mk¯ − 1,m ∈ Z+,
which keeps the smart spoofer s among the accepted neighbors
of the nodes in R3, ii) a false estimate value zˆh1 [k] = 9, where
k = mk¯,m ∈ Z≥0, on behalf of the node h = 1, h ∈ R1, to
the nodes in R3. Fig. 6 shows the consequence of spoofing
in the estimations. The initial estimate values of the nodes
in R2 and R3 remain constant for all the future time. It is
noteworthy that, not only the nodes in R3 are affected by the
spoofing, but the nodes in R2 are also affected indirectly and
none of them can reach omniscience for z1.
While we primarily analyzed the success or failure of the
network omniscience in the transformed dynamic system, the
main results are valid for the original dynamic system with
different time histories of state values (Fig. 5 and Fig. 7).
VI. CONCLUSION
Combining the Byzantine adversarial strategies and spoofing
as a misbehaving technique, we introduced a new type of
cyber attack called smart spoofing. Then, we investigated the
problem of distributed observer design for LTI systems in
the presence of this attack which uses the asynchrony in
communications to threaten the network. Using a two-step
distributed mechanism, including a pre-executing algorithm
for recognizing the trusted neighbors and a local-filtering
algorithm for removing possible incorrect values induced by
the adversarial nodes, the regular nodes can achieve resilient
observation over so-called strongly robust graphs. We pro-
posed resilient topology constraints on static and time-varying
networks under the proposed adversarial threat. Numerical
simulations with a sample network system validate our analytic
results. The proposed designs are applicable to a vast range of
networked cyber-physical systems. In our future studies, we
consider resilient consensus problems prone to smart spoofing
attacks.
REFERENCES
[1] C. Kern, A. Kesavan, and N. Daswani, Foundations of Security: What
Every Programmer Needs to Know. Springer, 2007.
[2] J. Magiera and R. Katulski, “Detection and mitigation of GPS spoofing
based on antenna array processing,” Journal of Applied Research and
Technology, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 45–57, 2015.
[3] J. Su, J. He, P. Cheng, and J. Chen, “A stealthy GPS spoofing strategy
for manipulating the trajectory of an unmanned aerial vehicle,” Proc.
6th IFAC Workshop NECSYS, pp. 291–296, 2016.
[4] A. J. Kerns, D. P. Shepard, J. A. Bhatti, and T. E. Humphreys,
“Unmanned aircraft capture and control via GPS spoofing,” Journal of
Field Robotics, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 617–636, 2014.
[5] A. Dutta and C. Langbort, “Confiscating flight control system by stealthy
output injection attack,” Journal of Aerospace Information Systems,
vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 203–213, 2017.
[6] T. Zhang and Q. Zhu, “Strategic defense against deceptive civilian GPS
spoofing of unmanned aerial vehicles,” in Proc. Int. Conference on
Decision and Game Theory for Security. Springer, 2017, pp. 213–233.
[7] S. Gil, S. Kumar, M. Mazumder, D. Katabi, and D. Rus, “Guaranteeing
spoof-resilient multi-robot networks,” Autonomous Robots, vol. 41,
no. 6, pp. 1383–1400, 2017.
[8] V. Renganathan and T. Summers, “Spoof resilient coordination for
distributed multi-robot systems,” in Proc. Int. IEEE Symposium on Multi-
Robot and Multi-Agent Systems (MRS), 2017, pp. 135–141.
[9] N. A. Lynch, Distributed Algorithms. Morgan Kaufmann, 1996.
[10] S. M. Dibaji, M. Safi, and H. Ishii, “Resilient distributed averaging,” in
2019 American Control Conference (ACC). IEEE, 2019, pp. 96–101.
[11] F. Bonnet, X. De´fago, T. D. Nguyen, and M. Potop-Butucaru, “Tight
bound on mobile Byzantine agreement,” Theoretical Computer Science,
vol. 609, pp. 361–373, 2016.
[12] A. Jafarnia-Jahromi, A. Broumandan, J. Nielsen, and G. Lachapelle,
“GPS vulnerability to spoofing threats and a review of antispoofing
techniques,” International Journal of Navigation and Observation, vol.
2012, 2012.
[13] H. Ueda, R. Kurachi, H. Takada, T. Mizutani, M. Inoue, and S. Horihata,
“Security authentication system for in-vehicle network,” SEI Technical
Review, vol. 81, pp. 5–9, 2015.
[14] A. B. Alexandru, S. Pequito, A. Jadbabaie, and G. J. Pappas, “On the
limited communication analysis and design for decentralized estima-
tion,” in Proc. IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), 2017,
pp. 1713–1718.
[15] U. A. Khan, S. Kar, A. Jadbabaie, and J. M. Moura, “On connectivity,
observability, and stability in distributed estimation,” in Proc. IEEE
Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), 2010, pp. 6639–6644.
[16] S. Park and N. C. Martins, “Design of distributed LTI observers for state
omniscience,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 62, no. 2,
pp. 561–576, 2017.
[17] L. Wang and A. Morse, “A distributed observer for a time-invariant linear
system,” in Proc. American Control Conference (ACC), 2017. IEEE,
2017, pp. 2020–2025.
[18] A. Mitra and S. Sundaram, “Resilient distributed state estimation for
LTI systems,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.09651, 2018.
[19] S. M. Dibaji and H. Ishii, “Resilient consensus of second-order agent
networks: Asynchronous update rules with delays,” Automatica, vol. 81,
pp. 123–132, 2017.
[20] S. M. Dibaji, H. Ishii, and R. Tempo, “Resilient randomized quantized
consensus,” IEEE Transaction on Automatic Control, 2017.
[21] A. Mitra and S. Sundaram, “Secure distributed state estimation of an
LTI system over time-varying networks and analog erasure channels,”
in 2018 Annual American Control Conference (ACC). IEEE, 2018, pp.
6578–6583.
[22] S. M. Dibaji, M. Pirani, D. B. Flamholz, A. M. Annaswamy, K. H.
Johansson, and A. Chakrabortty, “A systems and control perspective of
cps security,” Annual Reviews in Control, 2019.
[23] H. J. LeBlanc, H. Zhang, X. Koutsoukos, and S. Sundaram, “Resilient
asymptotic consensus in robust networks,” IEEE Journal on Selected
Areas in Communications, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 766–781, 2013.
[24] A. Pelc and D. Peleg, “Broadcasting with locally bounded Byzantine
faults,” Information Processing Letters, vol. 93, no. 3, pp. 109–115,
2005.
[25] D. P. Bertsekas and J. N. Tsitsiklis, Parallel and Distributed Computa-
tion: Numerical Methods. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1989.
